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COUNTER-UAS APPLICATIONS ILLEGAL UNDER 18 U.S.C. §
32 ARE JUSTIFIED WHEN USING A REASONABLY
DEFENSIBLE COUNTER-UAS STRATEGY THAT
INCORPORATES RISK AND COMPLIANCE
CATEGORIZATIONS
JOSEPH J. VACEK*

ABSTRACT
Drones fly every day in U.S. airspace, and drone operations are forecasted to continue to grow. With that growth comes novel uses for drones,
but some uses of drones constitute nuisances, intrusions onto existing legal
rights, or even criminal acts. Currently, federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 32
categorically prohibits destruction or interference with any aircraft, which
includes a drone. There are technological defensive measures available
should a drone pose a threat, and the affirmative defenses of defense of property, self-defense, and necessity are available should the decision be made to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 32. Such an active counter-UAS action must be reasonable in response to the threat level for an affirmative defense to be defensible,
and a model compliance categorization that correlates with the threat level is
suggested as a reasonable baseline.

*†Joseph J. Vacek, J.D. is a 2006 graduate of the University of North Dakota School of Law. He
teaches and researches in the discipline of aerospace law at UND. His research includes counterUAS law and technology, UAS policy and regulation, remote sensing, UAS insurance, and constitutional and privacy issues related to law enforcement and private drone use. The research for this
article resulted in an application for a patent applying an artificial intelligence algorithm to a counter-UAS system. Over the years, he has presented his UAS research to the United States Federal
Courts System; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals; the
Knowledge Foundation; the International Aviation and Transportation Safety Board Bar Association; and the American Bar Association.

500

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:3

I.

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 501

II.

SOME DRONE OPERATIONS HAVE EVOLVED INTO A
THREAT ........................................................................................ 502
A. PHYSICAL INTRUDERS THREATEN SAFETY OF FLIGHT AND
THOSE ON THE GROUND ......................................................... 503
B. CYBER INTRUDERS USING UAS AS TOOLS THREATEN CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIVATE DATA SECURITY ................. 503

III.

COUNTER-UAS IS PROHIBITED UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 32 ....... 504
A. UAS ARE AIRCRAFT UNDER HUERTA V. PIRKER .................... 505
B. AT LEAST THREE POTENTIAL EXCEPTIONS EXIST TO THE
CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION ON DESTRUCTION OR
INTERFERENCE WITH AN AIRCRAFT ....................................... 505
1. Partial Temporary Disablement by Electronic Means ..... 506
2. Interference or Disablement Unrelated to Safety of Human
Lives .................................................................................. 506
3. Communicating False Information to a UAS That Does Not
Endanger the Safety of the Aircraft ................................... 507

IV.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES ARE AVAILABLE ........................... 507
A. CURRENT LEGAL COUNTER-UAS MEASURES INCLUDE
DETECTION, TRACKING, AND ALERTING ................................ 508
1. Passive Identification, Tracking, and Alert Systems Are a
Step in the Right Direction but Do Not Offer a Meaningful
Defense Against Intruding UAS ........................................ 508
2. Positive Identification of the Threat and Origination of the
Threat is a Necessary but Difficult First Step ................... 509
3. Technological Interrogation May Provide a Viable
Identification Solution but Is Not Mandated Until 2020 ... 511
4. Even Without Identification, Active Countermeasures Such
as Electromagnetic Pulses, Frequency Jamming, Physical
Incapacitation or Destruction or Capture May Be
Reasonable Responses to Intruding Drones...................... 513
B. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF DEFENSE OF PROPERTY AND
SELF-DEFENSE ARE AVAILABLE ............................................. 513

2018]

DEFENSIBLE COUNTER-UAS APPLICATIONS

501

1. Balancing Defensive Counter-UAS Force with NonCompliant Operators’ Rights by Compliance Categorization
Provides the Best Affirmative Defense to a Federal Criminal
Complaint or State Civil Claim ......................................... 514
a. Compliant Operators Would Be Provided the Benefit of
the Doubt and Counter-UAS Would Be Limited to
Technological Warnings ............................................. 515
b. Noncompliant-Ignorant Operators Would Be Subject to
Somewhat Intrusive Technological Verification or
Exclusion .................................................................... 516
c. Noncompliant-Purposeful Operators Would Bear the
Risk of Destruction or Loss of the Asset .................... 516
2. Correlation of the Existing Safety Management Systems Risk
Matrix with the Compliance Categorization Yields a
Defensible Counter-UAS Strategy: The Vacek Model ...... 517
V.

I.

CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 519

INTRODUCTION

There are more than one million drones operating legally in the United
States as of the date of this Article. As of 2018, over 1,000,000 Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, referred to as UAS or drones, were officially registered in
the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) database.1 To put that in context, there are about 320,000 registered piloted aircraft in the United States,
which includes sizes from single-engine training aircraft through transportcategory jet aircraft.2 The timespan in which drone registrations outpaced piloted aircraft registrations was approximately one month once the registration
system became available, and drone registrations then doubled in a single
year.3 Clearly, the drone industry has succeeded in entering U.S. airspace and
is poised to continue to grow. With that explosive growth comes several
problems – some uses of drones are nuisances, intrude onto other legal rights,
1. FAA Drone Registry Tops One Million, U.S. DEP’T TRANSPORTATION, https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/faa-drone-registry-tops-one-million (last updated Jan. 10, 2018).
2. FAA: More Registered Drone Operators than Registered Planes, WASH. POST (Feb. 8,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/faa-more-registered-drone-operators-than-registered-manned-aircraft/2016/02/08/384683d2-cec5-11e5-abc9-ea152f0b9561_story html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8d3d9377c04c.
3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/Unmanned_Aircraft_Systems.pdf (last visited Sept. 21,
2018).
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or even constitute criminal acts. Currently, federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 32
categorically prohibits destruction or interference with any aircraft, which
includes a drone.
This Article explains how a drone can pose a threat, examines the legal
framework that prohibits destruction or interference with a drone, and explores available technological defensive measures. The Article then analyzes
whether the affirmative defenses of defense of property and self-defense are
available should the decision be made to willfully violate 18 U.S.C. § 32. The
Article argues that active counter-UAS actions must be reasonable in response to the threat level for an affirmative defense to be defensible, and a
model compliance categorization that correlates with the threat level is suggested as a reasonable baseline.
The model compliance categorization includes three categories: Compliant Operators, Noncompliant-Ignorant Operators, and Noncompliant-Purposeful Operators. The threat level analysis correlated to the compliance categories is derived from a common aviation industry risk matrix, which
outputs three risk levels: Low, Medium, and High.4 The proposed Vacek
Model applies this approach to reasonable counter-UAS applications currently illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 32 and presents a defensible solution for responding to UAS intruders.
II. SOME DRONE OPERATIONS HAVE EVOLVED INTO A
THREAT
From delivery of contraband to prison yards5 to drone operators curious
as to how close they can fly to airliners on approach to landing6 to corporate
espionage,7 drones have been found to be useful tools in wrongdoing and
crime. Even international terrorist groups such as ISIS have used drones to
facilitate their activities.8 While small drones (under fifty-five pounds) are of
limited utility in the delivery of physical items or for long-distance missions,
the utility of small drones for relatively short-range intelligence gathering,
4. See Safety Risk Management Policy, FAA Order No. 8040.4B (May 5, 2017).
5. Tracy Samilton, Prisons Work to Keep Out Drug-Smuggling Drones, NPR (Nov. 15, 2017,
5:11 AM), https://www npr.org/2017/11/15/564272346/prisons-work-to-keep-out-drug-smuggling-drones.
6. Stephen Shankland, Drone Hovers Right Above Jet Landing at Las Vegas Airport, CNET
(Feb. 2, 2018, 5:15 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/drone-hovers-over-jet-landing-at-las-vegasairport/.
7. Corporate Risk Services, Drones: Threat from Above, G4S, http://www.g4s.ca/-/media/g4s/canada/files/whitepapers/usa/drones_threat_from_above.ashx (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
8. Mark Pomerleau, In Drones, ISIS Has Its Own Tactical Air Force, C4ISRNET (Sept. 21,
2017), https://www.c4isrnet.com/digital-show-dailies/modern-day-marine/2017/09/21/in-dronesisis-has-its-own-tactical-air-force/.
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surveillance, and reconnaissance is extremely valuable for relatively low expense.9 The threats posed by such misanthropic or criminal use of drones can
be categorized into physical hazards and cyber hazards.
A. PHYSICAL INTRUDERS THREATEN SAFETY OF FLIGHT AND THOSE
ON THE GROUND
While small drones arguably pose little threat to large passenger-carrying airliners, their mass combined with velocity (up to 100 miles per hour)
results in potentially lethal force in the event of a direct collision with a human – or at least significant injury from the impact or cuts from rotating
blades. Should a small drone disintegrate in flight, the falling pieces may
reach terminal velocity and injure people on the ground below. Even though
the probability of a catastrophic collision between a drone and an airliner is
likely quite low, the consequences of such an event would be severe, potentially resulting in hundreds of deaths, both of airline passengers and people
on the ground. The current radar systems used by air traffic control and installed in most large aircraft are not sensitive enough to detect small drones.
And even if one is sighted by a pilot, the small size of the drone, coupled with
the speed of the jet, leaves too little time for evasive maneuvers. Even so,
much more probable than a collision with a jet is a small drone creating a
safety hazard to those near or below it when it is operated recklessly at a low
altitude. The author of this Article recalls being out for a walk through a public park when a highly modified racing drone “buzzed” him at less than ten
feet. The author observed the operator to be using first-person-view (FPV)
goggles to control it, without an additional visual observer, and in a congested
area below trees where several people were exposed to the threat.
B. CYBER INTRUDERS USING UAS AS TOOLS THREATEN CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIVATE DATA SECURITY
Less immediately threatening, but much more generally risky to the population as a whole, are cyber intrusions facilitated by drone. An easily
grasped example of such a risk was the demonstration of a drone-enabled
hack of a printer on the thirtieth floor of an office building.10 Researchers in
Singapore in 2015 coupled a smartphone to a drone, tasked the phone with
impersonating a Wi-Fi connection, flew the drone up to the thirtieth floor
where the printer was located, and intercepted confidential documents being
9. See, e.g., COPTERSAFE, http://www.coptersafe.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
10. Kim Zetter, Hacking Wireless Printers with Phones on Drones, WIRED (Oct. 5, 2015, 7:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/drones-robot-vacuums-can-spy-office-printer/.
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sent to the printer.11 Use of drones as mobile electronic espionage units is
alarmingly common, to such an extent that an entire cottage industry has developed around detection and alert systems to combat such espionage.12 The
incredibly accurate, detailed imagery and other remotely sensed data obtainable by small drones poses an additional risk to critical infrastructure. The
unique perspective offered by a drone operating at up to several hundred feet,
coupled with high-resolution stabilized cameras, allows anyone to obtain detailed data for critical infrastructure, such as dams, electrical transmission
systems, power generation facilities, airports, public safety agencies and assets, and military hardware locations.13 Clearly, the capability to easily obtain
the tools that allow bad actors to gain access to, or information about, critical
infrastructure or private data is potentially devastating. The risks posed to air
traffic and people below from recklessly operated drones is also significant.
People also generally dislike the idea of drones compromising their privacy.
Together, threatening drone operations have raised the question of countering
those threats. At least one case responding to a perceived threat from a drone
by use of force has already occurred.14
III. COUNTER-UAS IS PROHIBITED UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 32
Federal law currently prohibits any counter-UAS (cUAS) activity beyond detection, tracking, and notification of the intrusion.15 The three relevant sections of 18 U.S.C. § 32 for cUAS purposes state:
(a) Whoever willfully—
(1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or
any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate,
overseas, or foreign air commerce;
....

11. Id.
12. See discussion infra Section IV.
13. An example of a drone with this capability is the Snipe Nano UAS by AeroVironment.
“Weighing less than 5 ounces, the Snipe requires no assembly and can be operation in less than 60
seconds, providing . . . over 15 minutes of immediate organic tactical overmatch – over the wall,
down the alley, around the hill.” AEROVIRONMENT, https://www.avinc.com/uas/view/snipe (last
visited Sept. 20, 2018).
14. See Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, 2017 WL 1088093, at *1 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 21, 2017).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2012).
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(5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety
of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life . . . ; [or]
....
(7) communicates information, knowing the information to be
false and under circumstances in which such information may
reasonably be believed, thereby endangering the safety of any
such aircraft in flight;
....
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years or both.16
A. UAS ARE AIRCRAFT UNDER HUERTA V. PIRKER
As a preliminary matter, the question of whether a UAS is actually an
aircraft subject to 18 U.S.C. § 32 and other federal laws and regulations governing the use and operation of aircraft, was answered in the affirmative in
Huerta v. Pirker.17 Since Pirker, the FAA has promulgated regulations for
small UAS18 and attempted a registration scheme.19 With the definitional status of UAS – specifically small UAS – settled, regulatory enforcement and
policing of rulebreakers becomes pressing, especially so considering the
rapid growth of small UAS operations. The relevant question is what defenses are available to property owners or people when UAS operators violate property rights or threaten an individual’s physical safety. At first glance,
18 U.S.C. § 32 appears to prevent any such self-help measures, but at least
three potential exceptions exist due to the special nature of UAS operations.
B. AT LEAST THREE POTENTIAL EXCEPTIONS EXIST TO THE
CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION ON DESTRUCTION OR INTERFERENCE
WITH AN AIRCRAFT
While the relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 32 appears to categorically
prohibit destruction or interference with an aircraft, the specific prohibitions
were drafted to apply to manned aircraft. This arguably leaves open the possibility of some exceptions for cUAS as currently written, as long as the
cUAS process and actions are reasonable. The possible exceptions are related
to technological cUAS actions that are simply impossible to execute upon
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. § 32(a).
Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, No. CP-217 (Nov. 18, 2014).
See 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2018).
See infra Section IV.A.2 for a discussion on registration and statutory hurdles.
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manned aircraft. They are: (1) partial temporary disablement by electronic
means; (2) interference or disablement unrelated to safety of human lives;
and (3) communicating false information to a UAS that does not endanger
the safety of the aircraft.
1. Partial Temporary Disablement by Electronic Means
Subsection (a)(1) criminalizes a number of actions directed towards aircraft; the list includes setting fire to, damaging, destroying, disabling, or
wrecking. Words are known by the company they keep, and all of the listed
statutory actions result in significant harm to an aircraft and would put it, to
some degree, in a state of emergency – or at least urgency. An intruding drone
subject to a cUAS system that triggers the drone’s “return to base” function,20
for example, has indeed been prevented from completing its original planned
flight, but it is not damaged, destroyed, or even disabled. Such a command is
similar to an air traffic control clearance to an airliner that directs the pilots
to a different destination (to avoid bad weather, for example) and is not equivalent to the category of harm intended by the statute. The intruder drone
simply follows the new command and returns to its base, which it would also
do automatically if it lost its communication link with its operator, or the
operator could issue the command if the drone’s location became lost. But a
cUAS system’s interference by commanding a return to base function is still
an interference, which implicates 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5).21
2. Interference or Disablement Unrelated to Safety of Human
Lives
Subsection (a)(5) prohibits interference or disablement of an aircraft
with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard
for the safety of human life.22 The disablement issue has been treated above,
and a cUAS system command to return to base is clearly interference. However, as long as the safety of any person on the ground (since UAS are not
piloted and carry no passengers) is not endangered or recklessly disregarded,
it appears that the interference would not be proscribed by the statute. Which
cUAS actions endanger safety or recklessly disregard human lives is a question of fact and of reasonableness, and a rubric for determining such cUAS
actions is discussed in detail later on in this Article.23

20.
21.
22.
23.

For a more detailed technological discussion, see infra Section IV.A.
See 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5) (2012).
Id.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
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3. Communicating False Information to a UAS That Does Not
Endanger the Safety of the Aircraft
Subsection (a)(7) prohibits “communicating false information to an aircraft knowing the information to be false and under circumstances in which
such information may reasonably be believed, thereby endangering the safety
of any such aircraft in flight.”24 A return to base command given by a cUAS
system is an intrusion into the communication channels between the drone
and the operator and would be a false command under the statute because the
operator did not give the command. Since the drone obeyed the cUAS “false”
command and returned to base, such an action violates the first part of 18
U.S.C. § 32(a)(7).25 Similar to the analysis of subsection (a)(5), however,
endangerment is also a required element.26 Here, endangerment is tied to the
aircraft’s safety rather than human safety. As long as the cUAS command
does not override the drone’s normal safety-compliance software,27 if installed, or cause an accident, this part of the statute is probably not violated
either.
IV. DEFENSIVE MEASURES ARE AVAILABLE
Counter-UAS includes a range of technological defenses, either passive
or active. Passive detection and tracking of intruding drones, as well as alerting the property owner or the police, do not violate 18 U.S.C. § 32 because
these actions endanger neither aircraft nor bystanders and therefore fall outside the scope of the statute. Active countermeasures implicate 18 U.S.C. §
32 and may fall into an apparent exception from the statute or clearly violate
it. 28 Should an active cUAS action such as an electromagnetic pulse, frequency jam, or physical incapacitation or destruction of the drone occur, it
more than likely violates 18 U.S.C. § 32.29 However, the affirmative defenses
of defense of property and self-defense may cover such cUAS action if the
actions were objectively reasonable.

24. 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(7) (2012).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Two examples of safety-compliance software include geofenced area programs and optical
detection and avoidance of obstacle programs. See, e.g., Eddie Schmid, Geofences and Responsible
Drone Flight, AUTEL ROBOTICS (Dec. 17, 2016), https://www.autelrobotics.com/blog/geofencesand-responsible-drone-flight/.
28. See supra Section III.B.
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2012).
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A. CURRENT LEGAL COUNTER-UAS MEASURES INCLUDE
DETECTION, TRACKING, AND ALERTING
A myriad of detection, tracking, and alerting cUAS systems are advertised to prevent UAS intrusion into sensitive areas, critical infrastructure, or
private property.30 While those systems display technological prowess and
offer an initial first step towards effective cUAS, positive identification of a
threat and the origin of the threat is necessary in building a defensible cUAS
strategy. But no comprehensive database of drones or operators exists. Additionally, a large portion of small UAS are currently not registered due to legal
wrangling over registration requirements and the lack of an effective way to
enforce those requirements.31 A mandated Air Traffic Management identification system, ADS-B, is slated to be in effect in 2020.32 That will help in
positive identification for cUAS, but non-compliant intruders still will pose
identification problems. Even without such identification, intrusive active
countermeasures may still be reasonable even though they violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 32.
1. Passive Identification, Tracking, and Alert Systems Are a Step
in the Right Direction but Do Not Offer a Meaningful Defense
Against Intruding UAS
There is a wide array of commercially available cUAS systems for purchase that generally advertise to identify, track, alert, and potentially actively
engage intruding UAS.33 All such systems advertised for sale in the U.S.
warn potential customers that passive identification, tracking, and alerting is
the limit of legal cUAS, but many suggest their products will integrate with
an active cUAS system if legally allowed (when located outside the U.S. or
operated by a government agency, for example).34 While identification followed by tracking and alerting forms the basis of any cUAS system, those
actions provide information only and are not actually defensive in nature. Of

30. See, e.g., DRONE DETECTOR, http://dronedetector.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018);
DETECT INC., https://www.detectinc.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018); AARONIA AG,
https://www.aaronia.com/
(last
visited
Sept.
20,
2018);
DRONESHIELD,
https://www.droneshield.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018); DEDRONE, https://www.dedrone.com/
(last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
31. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 restored the 2015 rule for “Registration
and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft,” 80 Fed. Reg. 78593, which was found
to be unlawful in Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
32. 14 C.F.R. § 91.225(a) (2018).
33. See sources cited supra note 30.
34. See, e.g., DEDRONE, https://www.dedrone.com/products/mitigation (last visited Sept. 20,
2018).
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course, any reasonable defense must be based on valid, timely information,
and the availability of cUAS systems indicates that the industry and marketplace understand that. There simply are not indiscriminate frequency jammers offered for sale as cUAS systems. Such a system would actually provide
defense in that everything using radio communications would be jammed and
inoperative, including personal phones and emergency services radios. But
that system would not provide any information, tracking, or alert possibility.35 Indiscriminate cUAS systems raise the very real problem of electromagnetic fratricide, where all other devices within the area are also incapacitated, meaning legitimate communication, control, and navigation functions
are disrupted.36 Clearly, a more selective, discriminating approach is required
to successfully counter an intruding UAS without unintentionally disrupting
other signals. Therefore, passive identification, tracking, and alert systems
address a current need but do not rise to the level of meaningful defense unless followed by action. With action, however, comes potential liability. Before acting, a person or autonomous system authorizing cUAS must positively identify and be certain that the target is a legitimate threat.
2. Positive Identification of the Threat and Origination of the
Threat is a Necessary but Difficult First Step
It is well established that the doctrine of transferred intent applies in both
criminal and tort law. Where an action intended to cause harm “misses” and
causes harm to a third party, the liability for the action is the same for the
actor.37 A cUAS system that misidentifies and causes damage to an innocent
drone implicates the doctrine of transferred intent. While the defense of a
reasonable mistake may be available in such a case,38 the first step to avoiding liability by transferred intent (and having to raise the reasonable mistake
defense) is to ensure the cUAS system can positively identify the threat before actively countering it.
Technologically it is rather simple to sense a nearby drone, and a variety
of sensors may be employed to that effect. The sensors in a cUAS system
may be visual-spectrum cameras, infrared-spectrum cameras, acoustical-frequency microphones, or radio frequency spectrum sensors, to name a few
35. See, e.g., HENSOLDT, https://www hensoldt net/solutions/land/electronic-warfare/vpj-rmultirole-rcied-jammer-family/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
36. DAVID L. ADAMY, EW 104: ELECTRONIC WARFARE AGAINST A NEW GENERATION OF
THREATS 284 (2015).
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: TRANSFERRED INTENT § 110(a) (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
38. See Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort
Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1421-24 (2010).
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common sensors. Visual-spectrum cameras are simply video cameras paired
with software that runs an algorithm to filter out images that do not match
known shapes or silhouettes of drones.39 The limitation of visual sensors is
obvious—a drone may be of an unknown shape and get past the filter since
the software does not recognize it as a drone, or the drone may be disguised
to look like a bird and evade detection that way. Adding infrared video can
address those problems, as drones are powered by motors and produce heat
as a by-product, which is easily sensed by infrared video. Infrared cameras
can be defeated by shielding or operating when the background temperature
is close enough to the drone’s temperature that it is invisible to the infrared
camera, however. An acoustic sensor can add sensing capability that visual
instruments lack by monitoring ambient sound and identifying particular
sound patterns associated with drone flight.40 The major limitation of acoustic sensors is range, since background noise and wind can sharply reduce their
effectiveness. Radio frequency spectrum detectors add a highly accurate detection parameter to cUAS systems. All electronics emit radio-frequency radiation when they operate, which is the basis for how radio works.41 In cUAS,
the drone’s motors, communication, control, and navigation functions all
emit a variety of electronic signals, which provide an electronic “fingerprint”
of a particular drone.42 Together, sensors aggregating visual, infrared, acoustic, and electromagnetic signals have the highest potential accuracy in detecting and positively identifying an intruding drone.43
Well-designed and robust cUAS platforms can even match a particular
intruder against an internal database to determine the type of drone from a
signal analysis alone, but such databases are proprietary and limited.44 However, that is only the first step. The drone is the unmanned platform operated
by the user, and the user’s information—the origination of the threat—also
must be determined prior to taking action. While a well-designed and robust
39. THOMAS M. LILLESAND ET AL., REMOTE SENSING AND IMAGE INTERPRETATION 190-99
(6th ed. 2007).
40. See generally BRENDAN HARVEY & SIU O’YOUNG, ACOUSTIC DETECTION OF A FIXEDWING UAV (2018), www mdpi.com/2504-446X/2/1/4/pdf (presenting results from experiments
conducted to investigate the viability of acoustic sensing to form the basis of a non-cooperative
aircraft collision avoidance system).
41. See WIM H. BAKKER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF REMOTE SENSING 41 (Klaus Tempfli et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2009).
42. Id.
43. Still, a home-built UAS would be able to defeat many of those sensors by simple disguise
or shielding to prevent signal-sending or identification.
44. See, e.g., Alan Perlman, Master List of U.S. Certified Drone Pilot Directories & Networks,
DRONE PILOT GROUND SCHOOL (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.dronepilotgroundschool.com/certified-drone-pilot-directory-list/ (a company offering to sell a version of a list of certified drone pilots
for marketing purposes).
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cUAS platform can accurately determine the type of intruding UAS by database matching, no such database exists for UAS operators. A large portion of
small UAS are currently not registered due to legal wrangling over registration requirements and the lack of an effective way to enforce registration requirements.45
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA) specifically
excluded amateur hobbyists from regulation.46 The FAA later promulgated a
rule requiring all small UAS operators to register their aircraft.47 While many
hobbyist operators complied, several sued, citing the 2012 FMRA. The
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed in Taylor v.
Huerta48 that FMRA was intended to exclude hobbyists from all regulation,
including registration.49 In December 2017, Congress then specifically required hobbyists to register their drones.50 Commercial operators are already
required to possess a license to operate small UAS by federal regulation.51
Eventually due to these registration requirements, all amateur hobbyists will
have registered their aircraft. While these two operator databases could be
used in identification, there still exists the fundamental problem that a person
could operate a drone without either a license or registration. Even the best
cUAS system coupled to a perfect database of registered operators still would
not be able to identify a rogue operator or determine the origination of the
threat, nor would it be able to discern whether a particular drone is flown by
a particular operator.
3. Technological Interrogation May Provide a Viable
Identification Solution but Is Not Mandated Until 2020
A potential solution to gaps in the registered operator database is a requirement that all airborne UAS broadcast a unique identifying signal, similar to the requirement that manned aircraft will have by 2020.52 An aviation
regulatory working group, the FAA’s Unmanned Aviation System Identifi-

45. DEDRONE, supra note 34.
46. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
47. Registration and Marketing Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 14 C.F.R. § 11
(2015).
48. 856 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
49. Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1093.
50. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat.
1283 (2017).
51. 14 C.F.R. § 107.12 (2018).
52. Id. § 91.225.
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cation and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (FAA ARC Committee) released its final report in December 2017, highlighting two methods to
require UAS to broadcast identification for electronic interrogation.53 The
two methods are direct broadcast and network publishing.54 Direct broadcast
is most similar to the system that aircraft use, called ADS-B, or Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast, where each UAS would transmit an identification signal that can be received by any receiver within broadcast range.55
The most significant drawback with this method is that transmitting a signal
strong enough to provide meaningful identification data requires significant
battery power, which is already quite limited on small UAS.56 The second
method, network publishing, would allow UAS to transmit at lower power
using location data via an approved Internet-based database that would then
be available to users for identification information.57 The most significant
drawback with this method is that both the UAS and the interrogation system
must be connected to the Internet to provide positive identification.58
The final report recommended both methods be combined in a way that
reduces the drawbacks of each individual method as much as possible while
providing the benefits of the best of each method, depending on the circumstances.59 In the cUAS context, intruders with bad intent still pose a problem
that a technological interrogation system such as ADS-B cannot address,
which is that bad actors may choose to ignore or disable their onboard interrogation/identification system. Even more problematically, the final report
from the FAA ARC committee recommended that the interrogation requirements be applied to operators only, not to manufacturers.60 If that recommendation is adopted, the natural inclination of consumers to demand lower
prices will induce manufacturers to continue to manufacture small UAS without ADS-B equipment installed, resulting in a large class of UAS that are
essentially unidentifiable – unless the operator elects voluntarily to register
it. Persons seeking to protect their property or themselves from intruding
drones appear to have little choice: the technological limits and relatively
generous regulatory requirements described above result in a rather high
probability that a drone will not be positively identified, even with the best
53. UAS IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING AVIATION RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, FED.
AVIATION ADMIN., ARC RECOMMENDATIONS FINAL REPORT 31-32 (2017).
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at 39
56. See ROBERT C. STRAIN ET AL., MITRE CORP., A LIGHTWEIGHT, LOW-COST ADS-B
SYSTEM FOR UAS APPLICATIONS 1 (2007).
57. ARC RECOMMENDATIONS FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 33-34.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2
60. Id. at 3
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passive countermeasures. It is only reasonable, then, to determine whether
active countermeasures may be engaged to defend from an intruding drone.
4. Even Without Identification, Active Countermeasures Such as
Electromagnetic Pulses, Frequency Jamming, Physical
Incapacitation or Destruction or Capture May Be Reasonable
Responses to Intruding Drones
It is axiomatic that no person should be required to submit to another’s
wrongful act, even though defending oneself from it is a wrongful act on its
own. Similarly, the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 32 notwithstanding, no person
should be subject to a wrongfully intruding drone and have no recourse of
defense. Defensive countermeasures such as electromagnetic pulses, frequency jamming, physical incapacitation, destruction, or capture are all available to some extent. For any unfamiliar with those terms, an electromagnetic
pulse, or EMP, in the cUAS context is a directed burst of energy strong
enough to damage electrical equipment.61 The strength of an EMP required
to damage a drone depends on how well shielded the drone is. Poorly designed electronic equipment can be highly susceptible to very weak EMPs –
an example of that is how a small static charge from walking on carpet can
ruin a completely unprotected microprocessor.62 Frequency jamming is
simply transmitting a stronger signal on the same radio frequency as the information signal, which overpowers it and disrupts the information flow.63
Physical incapacitation, destruction, or capture are self-explanatory and may
be accomplished in a variety of ways in the cUAS context. Whether one or
more of these countermeasures is appropriate in a given context will be discussed below. First, the foundation for using such countermeasures must be
built, and that foundation rests upon the bedrock principle of the right to defend oneself or one’s property from harm.
B. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF DEFENSE OF PROPERTY AND
SELF-DEFENSE ARE AVAILABLE
Defense of property and self-defense both justify conduct that, while violative of the law on its own, is allowable because the wrongfulness of the
original act outweighs the wrongfulness of the defensive act. Justification for
defense of property exists when a person uses “reasonable force to protect his
61. DEP’T OF DEF., ELECTRONIC WARFARE FUNDAMENTALS A-14 (2000), http://falcon.blu3wolf.com/Docs/Electronic-Warfare-Fundamentals.pdf.
62. Part 1: An Introduction to ESD, ESD ASS’N, https://www.esda.org/about-esd/esd-fundamentals/part-1-an-introduction-to-esd/.
63. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 61, at 9-1.

514

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:3

property from trespass or theft, when he reasonably believes that his property
is in immediate danger of such an unlawful interference and that the use of
such force is necessary to avoid that danger.”64 The amount of force used to
defend property must be reasonable,65 and therefore “[i]t is not reasonable to
use any force at all if the threatened danger to property can be avoided by a
request to the other to desist from interfering with the property.”66 The Model
Penal Code requires a person to make a request to desist before using force,
unless that would be useless or dangerous.67 Justification for self-defense exists when a person who is not an aggressor uses “a reasonable amount of force
against his adversary when he reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate
danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of
such force is necessary to avoid this danger.”68 While there is much nuance
in the law regarding the duty to retreat,69 imminence of attack,70 or injuries
to third persons,71 those considerations apply to other persons, not to objects
(like drones).72 While defending oneself against a drone might conceivably
result in injury to a third person, this analysis is focused solely on the question
of the applicability of affirmative defenses to cUAS under 18 U.S.C. § 32.
1. Balancing Defensive Counter-UAS Force with Non-Compliant
Operators’ Rights by Compliance Categorization Provides the
Best Affirmative Defense to a Federal Criminal Complaint or
State Civil Claim
For the purposes of this analysis, intruding UAS can be categorized into
three general areas of apparent compliance depending on the nature of the
intrusion and data (if any) obtained using a cUAS system. In escalating order
of non-compliance and therefore increasing risk, those three areas are: (1)
Compliant Operators, (2) Noncompliant-Ignorant Operators, and (3) Noncompliant-Purposeful Operators. The framework presented here isolates the
most relevant predictor useful to determine a UAS intruder’s threat level,
which is the operator’s behavior compared to a known set of rules. Such a
determination can be accurately made by a software algorithm and would not
64. 2 LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.6 (3d ed. 2017).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 10.6(a) (citing State v. Cessna, 170 Iowa 726, 153 N.W. 194 (1915); State v. Woodward, 50 N.H. 527 (1871)).
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
68. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.4.
69. See id. § 10.4(f).
70. See id. § 10.4(d).
71. See id. § 10.4(g).
72. See id. § 10.4.

2018]

DEFENSIBLE COUNTER-UAS APPLICATIONS

515

require human input, which lends itself to scalable cUAS systems. While the
design of such software algorithms is beyond the scope of this Article, the
need for software, rather than a human, to make defensive cUAS decisions is
evident by the sheer volume of UAS intrusions currently reported by existing
systems in sensitive locations.73 The threshold requirements of each category
will be discussed in detail next.
a. Compliant Operators Would Be Provided the Benefit of
the Doubt and Counter-UAS Would Be Limited to
Technological Warnings
Compliant Operators are assumed to know the rules and regulations pertinent to drone operation, and that they will follow them. Nonetheless, an
operator who knows and intends to follow the rules can still violate them
unintentionally. An example of such a mistake could be a commercial UAS
operator gathering visual imagery of a bridge for an inspection. During the
course of the inspection the UAS is blown off course by gusty winds, momentarily flying over pedestrians on the bridge in violation of federal regulations. Assuming the UAS operator had done due diligence in checking the
weather conditions for the flight, the technical violation was unintentional
and should not result in punishment. If a cUAS system were in place and a
similar intrusion occurred because of a wind gust, the cUAS system should
react with appropriately mild defensive measures. To continue with the example, an ideal cUAS system here would have been monitoring the UAS as
it was operated outside the boundary line, identifying it either by passive visual/audio/electronic signature or active interrogation.74 Once the UAS intruded, the cUAS system would compare the vector and time of its intrusion
with local weather conditions and geography to prepare a defense. In this
example case, the appropriate defense would be a warning, broadcast on the
communication frequency of the UAS and relayed back to the operator that
an intrusion occurred with a request to exit the protected area. Once the UAS
maneuvered outside the boundary, broadcast of the warning signal would
cease. A record of intrusions and warnings could be kept and repeat violators
could be subject to more formal warnings before aggressive defensive
measures would be used.

73. Dan Parsons, DOD Demands Authority to Destroy Drones in Restricted Airspace,
AVIONICS INT’L (May 9, 2018), https://www.aviationtoday.com/2018/05/09/dod-demands-authority-destroy-drones-restricted-airspace/.
74. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
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b. Noncompliant-Ignorant Operators Would Be Subject to
Somewhat Intrusive Technological Verification or
Exclusion
Noncompliant-Ignorant Operators would be categorized by comparing
their operation of the drone to the rule structure to infer the operator’s intent.
An example of a noncompliant-ignorant operation would be the operation of
an off-the-shelf UAS that has a known signature but is not registered that is
then flown as high as the aircraft will go, in violation of the altitude limit of
400 feet. Such behavior is easily quantified as noncompliant-ignorant because the noncompliance is straightforward to determine for a cUAS system.
Ignorance can be inferred by the nature of the violation. Non-registration is
likely an omission here when paired with the behavior of a maximum altitude
flight, since there is little use of a small UAS at very high altitudes. Such
Noncompliant-Ignorant Operators would be subject to something more than
a mere warning, since their actions are quantitatively more likely to cause
harm, albeit unintentionally. In the example of the non-registered drone flying up to maximum altitude, the risk to airline passengers increases, even
though insignificantly. Depending on the nature of the violation, a cUAS system could either broadcast a command displayed to the operator (land now!)
or code directly to the UAS (return to base).
c. Noncompliant-Purposeful Operators Would Bear the Risk
of Destruction or Loss of the Asset
Noncompliant-Purposeful Operators would be categorized by comparing their operation to the rule structure in the same manner as for Noncompliant-Ignorant Operators described above, but the inferred intent is purposeful towards causing harm or criminality. An example of a noncompliantpurposeful operation would be a non-identifiable UAS that has a masked or
shielded electronic signature, is not registered, and is continuously flying
over critical infrastructure, such as a major airport. The lack of identifying
data available to a cUAS system, coupled with the location and nature of the
flight, indicate non-compliance and purposeful behavior. Aggressive countermeasures would be the appropriate response in such a case, meaning potential loss or destruction of the UAS, depending on the specific countermeasure used. Countermeasures for capture or destruction must be carefully
designed to fit the context in which it is used. In the example given, a UAS
flown continuously over a major airport is a significant safety risk and must
be mitigated quickly. However, destruction of the UAS is not ideal because
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the pieces would fall onto the runways, taxiways, and ramps, effectively closing the airport until all the pieces were cleaned up so as not to be ingested
into and damage an aircraft engine.
2. Correlation of the Existing Safety Management Systems Risk
Matrix with the Compliance Categorization Yields a
Defensible Counter-UAS Strategy: The Vacek Model
The above described compliance categorization measures only one variable—intent—needed to yield a defensible cUAS strategy. The other necessary variable must measure the risk posed by the intruding UAS. Fortunately,
risk measurement tools are common in the aviation discipline, so applying an
appropriate one is simple.75 Assessing the overall risk an intruding UAS
poses requires determination of two initial factors—the likelihood of harm
and the severity of harm. These factors are well established as valid predictors of overall risk in aviation.76 First, the resultant risk combination of likelihood and severity of harm would be categorized into an overall risk of either
Low, Medium, or High, per the matrix below.77
Severity in the cUAS context would depend on the mass, speed, payload,
and other relevant characteristics of the UAS as sensed by the cUAS system.
Catastrophic severity would be an event on the level of a collision with an
airliner full of people.78 Hazardous severity would be something like overflight of a large crowd of people where there would be no safe landing
place.79 Major severity would be something like flight over a freeway where
a collision with a car could result in a major traffic pile-up.80 Minor severity
would be akin to property damage only, and minimal severity would be legal
harm only, such as a trespass.81
Likelihood would be assessed based upon geographic location and demographics – for example, whether an area is densely populated or sensitive
infrastructure is located nearby.82 Once the overall risk of either Low, Medium, or High is determined, the compliance categorization described above
would be applied using a similar matrix approach. For this final step, the output of the risk matrix would be input as a single variable, with the compliance
75.
76.
2010).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Safety Risk Management Policy, FAA Order No. 8040.4B (May 2, 2017).
FAA Airports (ARP) Safety Management System, FAA Order No. 5200.11 (Aug. 30,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FAA Order No. 5200.11.
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categorization of Compliant, Noncompliant-Ignorant, and NoncompliantPurposeful being the other variable, per the Vacek Model.83
An example to demonstrate how the model would work in practice is
useful for clarity. Assume for this scenario that a building security manager
of a large multi-story office complex in a busy downtown metropolitan area
purchases and deploys a cUAS system. The system reports multiple observations of the same drone landing on an upper-story ledge, loitering for between
two and twenty-five minutes, then departing. The system identifies the drone
as a commercially available “consumer” drone, and the drone is not displaying registration information or broadcasting registration data. Using the
Vacek Model first requires a risk analysis using the risk matrix. Because the
flights are occurring in a busy downtown area where injury to people below
could result from a forced landing, and because loss of control of the drone
is somewhat probable due to operations in a complex environment with long
loiter times (most small drones can only remain airborne for about 30
minutes), the risk matrix indicates moderate risk for this example.84
Applying the compliance categorization to the example is next. The observed behavior of the drone shows repetitive flights and some loitering.
There is no indication of permission to land on the building in the example,
and the operation therefore is not compliant with existing UAS rules. Because
the drone is not registered or broadcasting compliant identification data, Noncompliant-Ignorant status can be presumed at a minimum. According to the
Vacek Model, reasonable defensive countermeasures could include non-destructive interference or a “return to base” command. If the cUAS system
broadcasts such a command successfully neutralizing the threat, the data
would be archived. If the same drone appears again, it can be assumed that
the next flight is purposeful, and at that point nondestructive disablement or
temporary capture would be reasonable. As the example shows, the Vacek
Model is an iterative process, where the data is stored for retrieval by the
system as needed to respond to a threat, or for later use to show that the countermeasure was reasonable in the circumstances.
The Vacek Model described above and tested hypothetically using both
risk analysis and compliance categorization, yields a defensible cUAS strategy. As long as the cUAS system is able to gather the maximum amount of
data available about an intruding UAS and the algorithm processes the data
in accordance with the above procedure, active countermeasures that would
otherwise violate 18 U.S.C. § 32 will fall under the affirmative defenses of

83. Copyright Joseph J. Vacek, 2017
84. See FAA Order 5200.11.
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either defense of property or self-defense. However, algorithms are not perfect and there must be a mechanism to correct mistakes and reimburse legitimate UAS users for loss of their property when a cUAS system incorrectly
identifies a threat and deploys active countermeasures.
As a final point, the Vacek Model output must be subject to a post-hoc
reasonableness analysis to provide a mechanism for wrongly countered UAS
operators to recover damages and to improve cUAS decision-making. The
courts are well positioned to determine whether a particular cUAS action was
reasonable or not, and good cUAS systems will securely archive the data associated with an active countermeasure so it will be available as evidence in
future litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Explosive growth of UAS use by companies small and large as well as
general consumers brings nuisance issues, intrusions onto legal rights, and
even criminal acts. While 18 U.S.C. § 32 prohibits destruction or interference
with any aircraft, including drones, this Article has explained how countermeasures may be justified using the affirmative defenses of either defense of
property or self-defense. Any such counter-UAS actions must be reasonable
in response to the threat level for an affirmative defense to be defensible, and
a model compliance categorization that correlates with the threat level is suggested as a baseline. The proposed Vacek Model includes three categories:
Compliant Operators, Noncompliant-Ignorant Operators, and NoncompliantPurposeful Operators. The threat level analysis correlated to the compliance
categories is derived from a common aviation industry risk matrix, which
outputs three risk levels: Low, Medium, and High. When applied to counterUAS applications currently illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 32, the Vacek Model
becomes a defensible solution for responding to UAS intruders.

